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Abstract
I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal
interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers
that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with
an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest
rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist
even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist
if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate
the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate
equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare,
from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the
threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system
that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures
do not exist.
Keywords: nominal price rigidities; interest rates; non-Ricardian fiscal
policy
JEL classification: D45; D50; E52
1 Introduction
It is well known that nominal price rigidities can be associated with inef-
ficiently low aggregate demand and involuntary unemployment. A usual
argument is that monetary policies that set low nominal interest rates can
stimulate aggregate demand and economic activity, as borrowing costs fall,
and reduce unemployment. There is a limitation to this argument. I demon-
strate that the effectiveness of monetary policy depends, crucially, on the
type of the fiscal system. Under fiscal systems associated with large inequal-
ities in the wealth distribution, low or zero interest rate policies may not be
effective whereas under fiscal systems that reduce wealth inequalities, low
nominal rates can be effective.
Here, in a cash-in-advance economy, nominal interest rates are the cost of
liquidity and fiscal policy sets lump-sum transfers affecting the distribution
of wealth. Under a fiscal system associated with an unequal distribution of
wealth and at low or even zero nominal interest rates, coordination failures
exist, that is, unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employ-
ment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are
below a threshold. Moreover, full employment allocations for high nominal
rates (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemploy-
ment allocations for low or even zero nominal rates. Finally, a sufficiently
progressive fiscal system suffices to “eliminate” coordination problems.
Nominal price rigidities are modelled by setting, exogenously, the price of
goods. Arbitrary prices are associated with excess capacities in the market,
i.e., excess supplies or excess demands. Prices associated with zero excess
capacities are denoted as competitive prices and the respective allocations as
competitive allocations. Nominal rigidities equilibria are classified into two
types: Keynesian equilibria characterised by demand-determined output and
involuntary unemployment and demand rationing equilibria where agents
are constrained on demand.
A monetary-fiscal authority prints money balances, issues nominal bonds
and distributes its revenue to households with transfers. Monetary pol-
icy sets nominal interest rates and fiscal policy specifies transfers. A fiscal
policy is called “Ricardian” if it guarantees that the monetary-fiscal au-
thority’s terminal conditions are satisfied for all possible, equilibrium or
non-equilibrium, values of the endogenous variables. This is equivalent to
say that the monetary-fiscal authority has a budget constraint. This policy
does not add enough restrictions for determinacy of equilibrium. If, how-
ever, fiscal policy is not of this form, it may add additional restrictions and
determinacy may obtain. The monetary-fiscal authority’s budget, in that
case, is satisfied only for equilibrium values of the endogenous variables.
I specify a non-Ricardian fiscal policy to get determinacy. What type
of non-Ricardian policy to specify is not obvious; various specifications can
be found in the literature. Heterogeneity among households will depend on
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whether households are rationed on the labor market or not, i.e., households
can be either employed or fully unemployed. I consider a policy that sets
nominal transfers to households depending on employment status. This pol-
icy, and what is important for the analysis, is equivalent to heterogeneity in
non-labor net wealth of households. Higher transfers to unemployed house-
holds reflect a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that subsidises and taxes
appropriately and manages to reduce the inequality in the wealth distribu-
tion. On the other hand, Auerbach et al. (2016) argued that in the U.S.,
where the fiscal system is highly progressive, financial wealth is distributed
very unequally in the population, labor earnings are more equally distributed
relative to financial wealth, high labor earning groups hold most of the finan-
cial wealth in the economy, and the inequality in the overall spending distri-
bution1 is large. The important contribution of financial wealth inequality
to the overall spending inequality is captured here by assuming that non-
labor net income of employed is higher relative to unemployed households
that, in turn, reflects a progressive fiscal system that is associated with large
inequalities in the overall distribution of wealth.
The non-Ricardian policy imposes restrictions on the equilibrium sys-
tem that affect the qualitative properties of nominal rigidities equilibria. I
characterise restrictions on policy parameters under which nominal rigidities
allocations are far from competitive allocations, for prices close or equal to
competitive prices.
Excess capacities under demand rationing equilibria vanish at competi-
tive prices. Under the specific non-Ricardian policy, and irrespective of the
characterisation of monetary policy, demand rationing equilibria can not
be supported at competitive prices because the monetary-fiscal authority’s
budget is always violated.
The qualitative features of Keynesian equilibria are in sharp contrast
to demand rationing. Under a policy of higher transfers to unemployed
households, excess capacities vanish at competitive prices, or, equivalently,
a Keynesian equilibrium can not be supported at competitive prices. On
the other hand, under a fiscal system associated with a very unequal dis-
tribution of wealth, at low or even zero nominal rates, excess capacities
do not vanish and one Keynesian equilibrium exists at competitive prices
whereas at high nominal rates, excess capacities vanish. A threshold deter-
mines high and low nominal rates. It is derived from a relation (inequality)
between nominal seignorage profits (revenue of the monetary authority), at
competitive prices, and a cut-off point that depends on nominal transfers
(liabilities). Seignorage revenue goes to zero with the interest rate. Non-
vanishing excess capacities are equivalent to seignorage profits below the
cut-off point. As interest rate increases, nominal price inflation drives the
increase of seignorage revenue. Vanishing excess capacities is equivalent to
1Defined as financial wealth plus labor earnings plus net taxes.
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seignorage revenues equal or above the cut-off point.
Finally, setting prices at competitive values, I demonstrate that aggre-
gate welfare under the competitive allocation for an interest rate equal to
the threshold (coordination frictions do not exist), is greater than aggregate
welfare under the Keynesian allocation for any non-negative interest rate
below the threshold. An interesting trade-off emerges. Welfare under the
competitive allocation is a decreasing function of the liquidity cost. On the
other hand, under the Keynesian allocation, low liquidity costs are bene-
ficial for employed households but are associated with high unemployment
rates. The intuition behind the result is that at low or zero nominal rates,
the unemployment rate is high enough such that the Keynesian allocation
is worse, in terms of aggregate welfare, from the competitive allocation.
1.1 Literature
Money is modelled with cash-in-advance constraints. Notable contributions,
among others, to the literature include: Lucas and Stokey (1987), Woodford
(1994), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis
(2005). The monetary economy is a one-period version of Nakajima and
Polemarchakis (2005).
The non-Ricardian specification is closest to Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2003) where agents are endowed with outside money. Other examples of
non-Ricardian policies considered by Woodford (1994), Woodford (1996),
Benhabib et al. (2002) and Benhabib et al. (2001) is to set real transfers
and the composition of the monetary-fiscal authority’s portfolio.
The modelling of nominal rigidities equilibria follows the fix-price liter-
ature. Notable contributions, among others, include: Barro and Grossman
(1971), Benassy (1975), Dreze (1975), Malinvaud (1977), Laroque (1978),
Silvestre (1982) and Herings (2014). Money is modelled as an argument
of the utility function as in the static frameworks of Malinvaud (1977) and
Laroque (1978) or as a store of value, and an argument of the indirect util-
ity function, that links periods as in Benassy (1975). My motivation was
to model money as fiat money, with cash-in-advance constraints. Following
this approach, the specification of fiscal policy is necessary because revenues
of the monetary-fiscal authority have to be distributed to agents and also,
it is crucial for determinacy of equilibrium. Laroque (1978), in an envi-
ronment without policy, argued that local unicity is not warranted, that is,
there may exist price systems close to competitive prices, for which fix-price
allocations are far from competitive allocations. He characterised conditions
for local uniqueness or, equivalently, for fix-price allocations to be written as
a function of the price system. Here, monetary and non-Ricardian policies
impose restrictions under which Keynesian allocations are far from competi-
tive allocations for prices close to competitive prices. Benassy (1975) did not
consider policy. On the other hand, Malinvaud (1977) incorporated fiscal
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policy. A government finances real spending by taxing firm’s profits and by
printing money balances. The government has a budget constraint and as
a result, fiscal policy does not add additional restrictions to the equilibrium
system. He considered various comparative static experiments. Specific
functional forms, rather than the specification of fiscal policy, guaranteed
well-defined equilibria close to competitive prices, i.e., allocations can be
written as a function of prices.
Silvestre (1980) and Citanna et al. (2001), in environments without pol-
icy, demonstrated existence of equilibria with Keynesian features as a result
of coordination failures. Herings (2014) characterised sticky-price equilibria
in an economy with a transaction technology for money that incorporates
cash-in-advance as a special case, monetary policy sets the nominal interest
rate and importantly, fiscal policy is Ricardian.
Unemployment is not a result of search and matching frictions as in
Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) and the literature over there. On the contrary,
unemployment is either a result of prices associated with excess supply in
the labor market or a result of coordination failures. Moreover, following
Malinvaud (1977), rationing on the labor market takes the following form:
a fraction of households are excluded from the labor market and are fully
unemployed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the economy. Sec-
tion 3 discusses some features of nominal rigidities equilibria. Section 4
presents the main characterisation. Section 5 presents the welfare result.
All derivation are in the “Appendix”.
2 Economy
I consider a two-period economy with cash-in-advance constraints and nomi-
nal price rigidities; the second period is added only for accounting purposes.
There are three commodities: consumption, labor and money. Money is
nume´raire. There is a continuum [0, 1] of households, denoted by i, with
identical preferences. Households are subject to cash-in-advance constraints.
A firm employs labor, produces aggregate output but is not subject to cash-
in-advance constraints. Finally, a monetary-fiscal authority prints money
balances, issues nominal bonds, collects firm’s profits and distributes its
revenue to households. Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate on
bonds.
Nominal price rigidities are modelled by fixing exogenously the price of
consumption and labor. At arbitrary prices, equality between buyers de-
mands and sellers supplies may not be achieved. A rationing mechanism
allocates goods between buyers and sellers. In particular, agents face quan-
tity constraints on the amount of goods they trade and, consequently, they
form their constrained demands and supplies. Equilibrium is characterised
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by equality of constrained demands and supplies; quantities rather than
prices adjust to balance markets.
Assumptions about rationing follow Malinvaud. Rationing of households
on the labor market takes the following form: the household is either not
rationed on the supply of labor (employed) or is fully unemployed. Rationing
of households on the good’s market is assumed to operate in a way that only
employed households are constrained. Rationing of the firm on the good’s
market is modelled with a constraint on output sales and on the labor market
with a constraint on labor demand.
I analyse three market regimes2: Keynesian regime where households
and the firm are constrained on supply, classical regime where employed
households are rationed on demand and unemployed on labor supply and
excess demand regime where households are rationed on demand and the
firm on labor demand.
The assumption below is made throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. (Non-Ricardian specification). Nominal transfers, δi, are
specified as follows:
δi =
{
τ, if i employed;
τ̂ , if i unemployed;
0 < τ, τ̂ <∞ and τ 6= τ̂ .
Fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that depend on the employment sta-
tus of households. Determinacy of equilibria derives only from the fact that
τ and τ̂ are exogenously specified. Construction of the classical regime re-
quires τ 6= τ̂3. I consider all other cases: τ > τ̂ or τ < τ̂ .
Firm’s profits accrue to the monetary-fiscal authority and are distributed
to households with transfers. This assumption implies that non-labor net
wealth of households is exogenous that, in turn, it allows me to characterise
necessary and sufficient conditions for existence (non-existence) of Keynesian
equilibria at competitive prices, that I can not do otherwise. Nevertheless, in
a remark in section 4, I demonstrate that sufficient conditions for existence of
Keynesian equilibria at competitive prices do not depend on this assumption.
The non-Ricardian specification is crucial. I provide an interpretation.
According to the assumption on profits, τ and τ̂ represent non-labor net
wealth of employed and unemployed households, respectively. The distinc-
tion between employed and unemployed can be thought of as a proxy for
the “rich” and the “poor”, respectively, in the population, e.g., unemployed
households might have been out of work for a prolonged period of time and
rely exclusively on unemployment subsidies. A τ̂ > τ policy can be associ-
ated with a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that subsidies unemployed,
2The names follow Malinvaud.
3This is an artefact of the set-up; I explain this point in the “Appendix”.
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taxes employed households and reduces the inequality in the overall dis-
tribution of wealth (although employed’s wealth is higher because of labor
income). Under τ̂ > τ , coordination failures do not exist. On the other
hand, a τ̂ < τ policy can be associated with a progressive fiscal system
that does not manage to reduce the inequality in the overall distribution of
wealth because financial wealth is very unequally distributed (the case of
the U.S.). Under τ̂ < τ , coordination failures may exist.
2.1 Households
Preferences are
U i = ln(ci) + ln(1− li);
c stands for consumption and l for labor supply. Also, households are en-
dowed with one unit of time.
The timing of transactions is as follows. The asset market opens first
where households acquire money balances to buy goods. Subsequently, the
good’s and labor market open. At the beginning of the second period house-
holds redeem their debts. First I present the monetary transactions and then
incorporate quantity constraints into the household’s decision.
At the asset market, households receive transfers, trade nominal bonds
with the monetary-fiscal authority and acquire money balances. The budget
constraint of the household in the asset market is
mi ≤ δi + 1
1 + r
bi; (1)
m stands for money balances, b for nominal bonds and r for the nominal
interest rate on bonds.
The market for the consumption good and labor open next. The pur-
chase of the consumption good is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint
pci ≤ mi; (2)
p stands for the price of consumption. The household receives money by
supplying labor to the firm. Money balances at the end of the period are
ni = mi − pci + wli; (3)
w stands for the nominal wage and n for money at the end of the period.
Lastly, households redeem their debts, i.e.,
bi ≤ ni. (4)
6
(4) is the transversality condition.
Substituting (3) into (2), the cash-in-advance constraint can be written
as
ni ≥ wli. (5)
Combining (1),(3) and (4), the budget constraint of the household is
pci +
r
1 + r
ni ≤ δi + wli. (6)
The cash constraint (5) can be written as
r
1 + r
ni =
r
1 + r
wli,
because if r > 0, the cash constraint binds; if r = 0, the cash constraint
does not bind and both sides of the equation are equal to zero. Substituting
this into (6), the budget constraint modifies as
pci ≤ δi + w
1 + r
li.
The budget constraint should bind at an optimum; that is, the transversality
condition is
bi = ni.
Households face quantity constraints on the labor and the good’s market
that are represented by nonnegative upper bounds l
i
and ci, respectively.
The choice of each i is
maxc>0, 0≤l<1 U i,
s.t.
pci = δi + w1+r l
i,
li 6 li, ci 6 ci.
(7)
Given p, w, r, δi, l
i
, ci, the household forms the constrained demands and
supplies that solve (7).
2.2 Firm
The firm employs labor, L, produces output, y, operating a decreasing re-
turns to scale technology f(L) =
√
L, and maximises profits pi. Constraints
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on the sales of output and on labor demand are represented by nonnegative
upper bounds y and L, respectively.
The choice of the firm is
maxy≥0, L≥0 pi = py − wL,
s.t.
y =
√
L,
y 6 y, L 6 L.
(8)
Given p, w, y, L, the firm forms the constrained demands and supplies that
solve (8).
2.3 Monetary-fiscal authority
The budget constraint of the monetary-fiscal authority in the asset market
is
M = T +
1
1 + r
B;
M , B and T stand for aggregate money balances, aggregate nominal bonds
and aggregate nominal transfers to households, respectively. Subsequently,
the monetary-fiscal authority receives revenue from bond’s issuance and from
collecting firm’s profits. The terminal condition at the beginning of period
two is
M = B + pi.
Substituting into the asset market budget constraint, I obtain the overall
budget
r
1 + r
M +
1
1 + r
pi = T,
where revenue consists of seignorage and firm’s profits and liabilities consist
of transfers to households. The non-Ricardian policy guarantees that the
terminal condition or, equivalently, the overall budget is satisfied only for
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. T is equal to the sum of τ
and τ̂ . The sum is taken with respect to the measure of households rationed
on the labor market; see the next section.
Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate at nonnegative values4:
0 6 r < ∞; assumption 1 provides a characterisation of fiscal policy. Fi-
nally, I denote the nominal interest rate and nominal transfers as policy
parameters.
4Because of no-arbitrage considerations.
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2.4 Equilibrium
To define an equilibrium, I need to specify precisely the rationing mech-
anism. As I demonstrate shortly, an agent can be rationed only on one
market at a time. Thus, an agent is rationed or constrained on a market
if the unconstrained schedule (optimal supply or demand under no restric-
tions) exceeds the respective upper bound.
Rationing of households on the labor market takes the following form: a
household is either employed or is fully unemployed (l
i
= 0). I denote the
measure of unemployed households by u; u is a proxy for the unemployment
rate. Rationing on the good’s market is assumed to operate in a way that
only employed households are constrained and face an identical upper bound
c. The fact that only employed households are demand rationed simplifies
the analysis. An intuition behind this assumption is as follows. The good’s
market opens for a fixed amount of time and households visit different shops
to buy goods. An employed household splits into a shopper-worker whereas
all members of an unemployed household visit the shops. I assume that the
shopper of an employed household, alone, is not as efficient as all the mem-
bers of an unemployed household to visit all the required shops and, hence,
to buy all the “desired” consumption by the time the good’s market closes.
As a result, employed households are demand rationed whereas unemployed
households are not.
The firm is constrained on sales by y and on labor demand by L. A
situation where the firm is constrained on both markets never occurs. Con-
strained demand and supply must belong to the production function. Drop-
ping one constraint will not alter production possibilities and the firm is not
constrained on that market.
An equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A nominal price rigidities equilibrium at (τ, τ̂ , r, w, p) consists
of quantity constraints, allocations and portfolios of households,
{
ci, l
i
, ci, li,
mi, bi
}
, i ∈ [0, 1], quantity constraints and allocations of the firm, {y, L, y, L}
and a portfolio of the monetary-fiscal authority, {M,B}, such that
1. given prices, policy parameters and quantity constraints, the house-
hold’s problem (7) is solved by ci, li, mi, bi;
2. given prices, technology and quantity constraints, the firm’s problem
(8) is solved by y, L;
3. the monetary authority accommodates the demand for money and
bonds,
∫ 1
0 m
idi = M and
∫ 1
0 b
idi = B;
4. good’s and labor market clear,
∫ 1
0 c
idi = y and
∫ 1
0 l
idi = L;
5. the market is in one of the following regimes:
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(a) Keynesian: li = l
i
= 0, ci < ci for unemployed households, li < l
i
,
ci < c for employed households and y = y, L < L;
(b) Classical: li = l
i
= 0, ci < ci for unemployed households, li < l
i
,
ci = c for employed households and y < y, L < L;
(c) Excess demand: li < l
i
, ci = c for i ∈ [0, 1] and y < y, L = L.
Conditions 1 and 2 require that agent’s behaviour is optimal. Condi-
tion 3 requires that the monetary authority accommodates the demand for
money and bonds. Condition 4 requires market clearing. Condition 5 de-
scribes the rationing mechanism; equalities imply agents are rationed on that
market whereas strict inequalities imply absence of rationing. Rationing is
one-sided: if the supply is constrained in a market, then the demand is
not constrained in that market and vice versa. Finally, satisfaction of the
monetary-fiscal authority budget follows from conditions 1-5.
I explain the details behind definition 1. To do that, it is necessary first
to present the optimal decisions of agents under no rationing. According to
(7), the optimal decision of each household is
ci =
1
2p
(τ +
w
1 + r
), li = 1− 1 + r
2w
(τ +
w
1 + r
). (9)
(9) represents the unconstrained schedule of each household. According to
(8), the optimal decision of the firm is
y =
p
2w
, L =
p2
4w2
, pi =
p2
4w
, (10)
where (10) represents the unconstrained schedule of the firm.
Under a Keynesian equilibrium, the optimal decision of each employed
household is given by (9) whereas unemployed are excluded from the labor
market and their consumption is equal to ci = τ̂ /p. The firm produces up to
y = y, labor demand is determined by y and the technological possibilities,
that is, it is equal to y2, and profits are pi = py − wy2. Rationing on the
good’s market requires
p
2w
> y; (11)
unconstrained supply exceeds y. The measure of unemployed households
must satisfy 0 < u < 1; u = 0 is not consistent with rationing on the labor
market and u = 1 is not consistent with good’s market clearing because
unemployed households demand a positive amount of the good but aggregate
output is zero if aggregate labor supply is zero. At given policy parameters
and prices, a Keynesian equilibrium consists of a measure u and a sales
constraint y such that markets clear, (11) is satisfied and 0 < u < 1. Finally,
aggregate transfers of the monetary-fiscal authority are T = (1− u)τ + uτ̂ .
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Under a classical equilibrium, employed households consume ci = c,
labor supply is determined from the budget constraint and decisions of un-
employed households are as before. Rationing on the good’s market requires
1
2p
(τ +
w
1 + r
) > c; (12)
unconstrained demand exceeds c. The firm is not constrained and its deci-
sions are given from (10). At given policy parameters and prices, a classical
equilibrium consists of a pair (c, u) such that markets clear, (12) is satisfied
and 0 < u < 1. As before, aggregate transfers are T = (1− u)τ + uτ̂ .
Under an excess demand equilibrium, there are no unemployed house-
holds and optimal decisions of (employed) households are as in the classical
equilibrium; condition 5(c) of definition 1 requires all households to consume
c, that, in turn, is consistent with the assumption on demand rationing.
The firm demands labor up to L = L, output is determined by L and the
technological possibilities, that is, it is equal to y =
√
L, and profits are
pi = p
√
L− wL. Rationing on the labor market requires
p2
4w2
> L; (13)
unconstrained demand exceeds L. At given policy parameters and prices,
an equilibrium consists of a pair (c, L) such that markets clear and (12) and
(13) are satisfied. Finally, aggregate nominal transfers are T = τ because of
full employment.
The benchmark case is the competitive equilibrium where agents are not
rationed (quantity constraints are not binding) and prices adjust to clear
markets. I state the definition of competitive equilibrium without reference
to quantity restrictions to point out that markets clear by price rather than
quantity adjustments.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium at (τ, τ̂ , r) consists of prices, {w∗,
p∗}, allocations and portfolios of households,
{
c∗i, l∗i,m∗i, b∗i
}
, i ∈ [0, 1],
allocations of the firm, {y∗, L∗} and a portfolio of the monetary-fiscal au-
thority, {M∗, B∗}, such that
1. given prices and policy parameters, the household’s problem (7) is
solved by c∗i, l∗i,m∗i, b∗i;
2. given prices and the technology constraint, the firm’s problem (8) is
solved by y∗, L∗;
3. the monetary authority accommodates the demand for money and
bonds,
∫ 1
0 m
∗idi = M∗ and
∫ 1
0 b
∗idi = B∗;
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4. good’s and labor market clear,
∫ 1
0 c
∗idi = y∗ and
∫ 1
0 l
∗idi = L∗.
Intuition behind conditions 1 to 4 is as before. The optimal decisions of
households are given from (9) and (10). I denote competitive equilibrium
values with a superscript ∗.
3 Preliminaries
For ease of exposition, I present some useful results before the main charac-
terisation. I discuss existence of equilibria and sketch some of the qualitative
features of each type of equilibrium; detailed derivations can be found in
sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the “Appendix”. Restrictions on policy parameters
satisfy either τ < τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞ or τ > τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞. For τ < τ̂ ,
it is guaranteed that the employed household’s allocation is individually ra-
tional, that is, it provides higher utility compared to the utility that can be
achieved with the unemployed’s allocation5. In the opposite case, employed
households may prefer to be unemployed and an equilibrium may not exist
(the firm can not hire labor, output is zero, unemployed’s demand is posi-
tive, and, as a result, market clearing is violated). On the other hand, for
any τ > τ̂ , any solution to the maximisation problem (7) satisfies individual
rationality.
The following proposition characterises the competitive equilibrium:
Proposition 1. (Competitive equilibrium). The competitive equilibrium is
p∗ =
2τ(1 + r)
√
3 + 2r
1 + 2r
, w∗ =
τ(1 + r)(3 + 2r)
1 + 2r
,
y∗ = c∗ =
1√
3 + 2r
, L∗ = l∗ =
1
3 + 2r
.
Proof. See section 6.1 of the “Appendix”.
(w∗, p∗) are the competitive prices. Monetary and fiscal policy impose
restrictions on competitive prices. The real allocation depends negatively
on r; r is the cost of liquidity. For τ < τ̂ , policy parameters are restricted
such that the competitive allocation is individually rational, e.g, given r, τ̂
close to τ suffices.
Policy parameters are set such that the competitive allocation is individ-
ually rational. Prices associated with a given type of equilibrium must satisfy
the respective inequalities discussed in section 2.4. Moreover, since the focus
of the paper is on whether allocations are close to or far from competitive
allocations for prices close to (w∗, p∗), I restrict prices in a neighbourhood
5Unemployment and, hence, transfers τ̂ , is the only outside option for employed house-
holds.
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of (w∗, p∗). There exist a neighbourhood and prices in that neighbourhood
associated with a given type of equilibrium.
Under an excess demand equilibrium, allocations are uniquely deter-
mined up to policy parameters and prices. As prices converge to compet-
itive prices, allocations converge to competitive allocations. At (w∗, p∗),
excess demands vanish, that is, they are equal to zero. A similar argument
applies under a classical equilibrium. On the other hand, the qualitative fea-
tures of Keynesian equilibria are in sharp contrast to the other equilibrium
types. Given restrictions on policy parameters associated with individually
rational competitive allocations, there always exist prices associated with
a Keynesian equilibrium that is characterised by vanishing excess supplies.
In particular, τ < τ̂ , 0 < r < ∞ and prices can only be associated with
one equilibrium of the Keynesian type, characterised by vanishing excess
supplies. On the other hand, τ > τ̂ , 0 < r < ∞ and prices may be associ-
ated (at most) with two equilibria of the Keynesian type, characterised by
vanishing and non-vanishing excess supplies, respectively.
Finally, multiple equilibria exist. There exist prices associated with more
than one type of equilibrium. Multiplicity obtains for any configuration of
policy parameters discussed at the beginning of this section. Since the focus
of the paper is on the qualitative properties of each type of equilibrium close
to competitive prices, I elaborate more on multiplicity in section 6.2 of the
“Appendix”.
4 Characterisation
Section 4.1 demonstrates that under an excess demand or a classical type of
equilibrium, excess capacities vanish at competitive prices and section 4.2
that a Keynesian type of equilibrium may exist at competitive prices.
4.1 Demand rationing
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Demand rationing). Under an excess demand or a classi-
cal type of equilibrium, excess capacities vanish at (w∗, p∗) or, equivalently,
demand rationing equilibria can not be supported at (w∗, p∗).
Proof. See section 6.2 of the “Appendix”.
The proof of proposition 2 is straightforward. I compute equilibria ex-
plicitly and demonstrate that as prices converge to (w∗, p∗), excess capacities
converge to zero. At (w∗, p∗), allocations equal competitive allocations and
demand rationing equilibria do not exist at competitive prices. This result
obtains for any configuration of policy parameters discussed in the previous
section.
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Non-existence of demand rationing equilibria at (w∗, p∗) derives from
the specific fiscal policy rule I have postulated and does not depend on the
characterisation of monetary policy. The intuition behind this result is that
the fiscal policy rule does not take into account the possibility of demand
rationing in the market. To see this, consider the (overall) budget constraint
of the monetary-fiscal authority, i.e.,
r
1 + r
M +
1
1 + r
pi = T. (14)
Liabilities under excess demand and competitive equilibrium are T = τ .
An excess demand equilibrium can not be supported at competitive prices
because (14) is violated, that is, liabilities equal revenue at the competitive
equilibrium that, in turn, is not equal to revenue under demand rationing.
(14) is trivially violated. Under a classical equilibrium, liabilities are equal
to T = (1 − u)τ + uτ̂ . As before, (14) is violated at competitive prices.
Combining good’s and money market clearing and no rationing of the firm,
it follows that M = p∗y∗ and pi = pi∗, respectively. (14) is satisfied only for
u = 0 or, equivalently, is violated for any 0 < u < 1.
The previous result is not modified if, in addition to nominal trans-
fers, the monetary-fiscal authority finances exogenous real fiscal spending
g, at prices p. As before, non-existence at competitive prices is equiva-
lent to violation of (14). Moreover, relaxing the assumption on profits by
assuming that profits are distributed to households will not modify the re-
sult. As before, under the specific fiscal policy rule, (14) is always violated
at competitive prices. On the other hand, existence of demand rationing
equilibria at competitive prices would require a fiscal policy that takes into
account, also, demand rationing in the market. In that case, liabilities of
the monetary-fiscal authority could adjust accordingly to allow satisfaction
of the monetary-fiscal authority’s budget and demand rationing might exist
at competitive prices. Specification of such a rule that is simple, intuitive
and guarantees existence of demand rationing equilibria is not obvious.
4.2 Keynesian equilibrium
Contrary to the previous result, a Keynesian equilibrium might exists at
competitive prices. The following proposition provides a characterisation:
Proposition 3. (Keynesian equilibrium).
1. Suppose τ̂ > τ and 0 < r <∞. Excess supplies vanish at (w∗, p∗) or,
equivalently, Keynesian equilibria can not be supported at (w∗, p∗).
2. Suppose τ̂ < τ < 2τ̂ .
(a) Suppose 0 < r < (τ− τ̂)/(2τ̂−τ). There exists a Keynesian equi-
librium characterised by non-vanishing excess supplies at (w∗, p∗).
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(b) Suppose (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) 6 r < ∞. Excess supplies vanish at
(w∗, p∗) or, equivalently, Keynesian equilibria can not be sup-
ported at (w∗, p∗).
3. Suppose τ ≥ 2τ̂ and 0 < r <∞. There exists a Keynesian equilibrium
characterised by non-vanishing excess supplies at (w∗, p∗).
Proof. See section 6.2 of the “Appendix”.
Since existence has been discussed in the previous section (preliminaries),
proposition 3 states only the qualitative properties of Keynesian equilibria
for different configurations of policy parameters. To determine if Keynesian
equilibria exist at competitive prices or, equivalently, if they are charac-
terised by non-vanishing excess supplies, I proceed as follows. I compute
the equilibrium explicitly as a function of prices and policy parameters and
subsequently, I set prices at (w∗, p∗) and look for conditions on policy param-
eters under which a Keynesian equilibrium satisfies definition 1 (conditions
1-5(a)). Under case 1 or case 2(b) and (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) < r <∞, prices in
a neighbourhood of (w∗, p∗) are associated with only one equilibrium of the
Keynesian type, characterised by vanishing excess supplies. Under case 2(a)
or 3, prices in a neighbourhood of (w∗, p∗) can be associated with two equi-
libria of the Keynesian type, characterised by vanishing and non-vanishing
excess supplies, respectively. Finally, case 2(b) and r = (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ)
is a special case on policy parameters. At any prices associated with an
equilibrium, the equilibrium is characterised by vanishing excess supplies;
there exist prices associated with a Keynesian equilibrium.
To explain the intuition behind existence of equilibria at competitive
prices, I proceed as follows. Prices are fixed at (w∗, p∗), for the rest of this
section, and as before, I use the budget constraint of the monetary-fiscal au-
thority. A simple relation (inequality) between nominal seignorage profits
and a positive and exogenous cut-off point determines existence and non-
existence at competitive prices. This cut-off point is equal to the difference
of transfers between employed and unemployed households that, in turn,
characterises the magnitude of inequality in the non-labor wealth distribu-
tion. Existence of a Keynesian equilibrium at low interest rates is equivalent
to low profitability of the monetary authority, that is, seignorage revenues
below the cut-off. On the other hand, as the interest rate increases, nomi-
nal price inflation drives the increase of seignorage revenue. Non-existence
is equivalent to seignorage revenues equal or above the cut-off point. The
argument is developed in two steps. First, I derive this relation and subse-
quently, I explain how it is related to the conditions of proposition 3. The
advantage of this argument, in comparison to the proof of proposition 3, is
that it “translates” restrictions on policy parameters to a simple relation be-
tween revenue (seignorage) and liabilities (transfers) of the monetary-fiscal
authority.
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To derive the relation between seignorage and transfers, it is convenient
to consider the following representation of the monetary-fiscal authority bud-
get:
r
1 + r
B + pi = T. (15)
(15) is equivalent to (14) if we take into account that M = B + pi (termi-
nal condition). Under this representation, (r/(1 + r))B are the profits of
the monetary authority from issuing bonds at a positive nominal rate. A
Keynesian equilibrium at (w∗, p∗) requires (15) and
B = (1− u)w∗l∗, pi = p∗y − w∗y2, (1− u)l∗ = y2, T = (1− u)τ + uτ̂ , (16)
where aggregate bonds equal aggregate labor income and labor market
clears; money demand is accommodated and good’s market clears residually.
Substituting (16) into (15) and rearranging, I define Φ as
Φ(u) ≡
r
1 + r
(1− u)w∗l∗ + p∗
√
(1− u)l∗ − w∗(1− u)l∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue
−((1− u)τ + uτ̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liabilities
). (17)
The competitive equilibrium requires Φ(0) = 0, a Keynesian equilibrium
requires Φ(u) = 0 for 0 < u < 1 and, also, Φ satisfies Φ(1) < 0. Revenue
is a decreasing function of u in the domain [0, 1] because both seignorage
and firm’s profits are decreasing functions of u. Liabilities are a decreasing
function of u if τ > τ̂ and increase with u if τ < τ̂ . It is immediate that
under case 1, a Keynesian equilibrium does not exist. Revenue decreases
with u, liabilities increase with u, Φ(0) = 0 and, as a result, Φ(u) < 0
for 0 < u < 1. On the other hand, under cases 2 and 3, both revenue and
liabilities are decreasing functions of u and existence depends on the relative
magnitude of the change of revenue and liabilities with respect to a change
of u that, in turn, depends on conditions on policy parameters. Moreover,
the derivative of revenue with respect to u, in absolute value, is increasing6
in u and tends to infinity as u→ 1 whereas the derivative of liabilities with
respect to u is independent of u. As a result, existence (non-existence) of
a Keynesian equilibrium is equivalent to Φ
′
(0) > (≤) 0 that, in turn, is
equivalent to
r
1 + r
w∗l∗ < (≥) τ − τ̂ . (18)
(18) is the aforementioned relation between nominal seignorage profits and
transfers of households. The right and the left hand side, respectively, are
6The derivative of firm’s profits with respect to u, in absolute value, tends to infinity
as u tends to one.
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the absolute values of the derivatives of liabilities and revenue with respect
to u, at u = 0 (the derivative of firm’s profits at u = 0 is zero since profits
are maximised at this point).
Seignorage profits depend on τ and r. For a given τ , seignorage is an
increasing function of r and as r →∞, it converges to τ/2. The competitive
equilibrium nominal wage w∗ is a decreasing function of r for r < (
√
2 −
1)(1/2) and increasing in r for r > (
√
2 − 1)(1/2). Labor supply l∗ is
decreasing in r (proposition 1). For low values of r, the increase of seignorage
profits as r increases is determined entirely by the increase of the tax rate
on money balances, i.e., r/(1 + r). On the other hand, for high values of r,
the increase of seignorage profits as r increases is determined entirely by the
increase of nominal wages. For ease of exposition, I present these qualitative
results in section 6.3 of the “Appendix”.
Under case 2, τ − τ̂ < τ/2. 2(a) is equivalent to (18) with the inequality
sign (<) and 2(b) with (≥). Seignorage profits go to zero with r. As a result,
for low values of r, existence of a Keynesian equilibrium is driven entirely
by the low profitability of the monetary authority. On the other hand, as r
increases, nominal wage inflation drives the increase of seignorage profits and
(18) is satisfied with the inequality sign (>). Non-existence of Keynesian
equilibria at high interests rates is driven by nominal wage inflation.
Under case 3, τ − τ̂ ≥ τ/2. Seignorage profits are between zero and τ/2
for any 0 < r <∞, (18) holds with the inequality sign (<) and a Keynesian
equilibrium exists at competitive prices. The distribution of non-labor net
wealth is very unequal and even a policy of sufficiently high interest rates,
that creates nominal wage inflation that, in turn, implies that seignorage
profits increase, can not “eliminate” Keynesian equilibria at competitive
prices.
The following remarks are in order.
Remark 1. Incorporating exogenous real fiscal spending g does not modify
the argument. Conditions on g exist such that the previous argument ap-
plies. I abstracted from fiscal spending since it does not contribute anything
substantial to the argument and, moreover, it complicates computations.
Remark 2. The assumption on profits allows me to characterise clean con-
ditions, as in proposition 3. Nevertheless, under τ > τ̂ and at low nominal
rates, existence of a Keynesian equilibrium at competitive prices does not
depend on this assumption. Suppose profits are taxed with ζ ∈ (0, 1) and
all households receive, as end-of-period money balances, a fraction 1 − ζ
of profits. Aggregate bonds equal aggregate labor income plus profits that
accrue to households (households borrow also against income from profits).
I can construct Φ as a function of u such that a competitive equilibrium
requires Φ(0) = 0, a Keynesian equilibrium requires Φ(u) = 0 for 0 < u < 1
and Φ(1) < 0. As before, Φ
′
(0) > 0 implies existence of Keynesian equilibria
at competitive prices and it is equivalent to expression (18) with a sign (<)
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since the derivative of firm’s profits with respect to u, at u = 0, is zero
(profits are maximised at this point). Computing the competitive equilib-
rium explicitly, it follows that the left hand side of (18) goes to zero with r
and, at low values of r, (18) can be satisfied with (<) and, hence, a Keyne-
sian equilibrium exists at competitive prices. Characterising a threshold in
that case is not clean since Φ
′
(0) 6 0 is no longer equivalent to non-existence
while solving for a Keynesian equilibrium explicitly requires numerical anal-
ysis.
Remark 3. Laroque (1978) characterised necessary and sufficient conditions
for allocations to be written as a function of the price system, for prices close
to competitive prices. These conditions require that marginal propensities to
consume and to supply labor, at competitive prices, are less than one. Here,
the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is defined as the derivative, in
absolute value, of the value of aggregate consumption with respect to u
divided by the derivative, in absolute value, of total income (the value of
total output) with respect to u, at u = 0. MPC > 1 is equivalent to (18)
with (<) whereas MPC 6 1 is equivalent to (18) with (>). Conditions for
non-vanishing excess supplies, equivalent to MPC > 1, violate the conditions
of Laroque.
Remark 4. The argument extends to r = 0 where cash-in-advance con-
straints do not bind. Construction of a competitive equilibrium is as follows.
Substitute r = 0 into equilibrium prices and allocations of proposition 1. At
these prices and allocations, households solve (7) (ignoring the quantity con-
straints). Also, according to the the proof of proposition 1, markets clear.
At the given prices and allocations, I can find money balances that satisfy
(2) or, equivalently, (5).
Construction of rationing equilibria is similar to section 6.2 of the “Ap-
pendix”. Given agents optimal decisions under each type of equilibrium, I
can solve for equilibrium allocations as functions of prices and nominal trans-
fers. Moreover, prices and transfers must satisfy the respective inequalities
associated with each type of equilibrium. Subsequently, given allocations
and prices, I can find money balances that satisfy (2) or, equivalently, (5).
Excess capacities under demand rationing vanish at competitive prices.
As argued in section 4.1, the result is driven by the specification of fiscal
policy rather than the characterisation of monetary policy.
Under τ < τ̂ , Keynesian equilibria do not exist at competitive prices;
the argument is similar to the previous discussion. Under any τ > τ̂ , a
Keynesian equilibrium exists at competitive prices. At r = 0, seignorage
profits are zero and (18) is satisfied with (<) that, in turn, is equivalent to
existence of a Keynesian equilibrium at competitive prices.
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5 Coordination failures and welfare
A Keynesian equilibrium can be the result of coordination failures rather
than the result of “wrong” prices. It is clear, under case 2 of proposition 3,
that coordination frictions prevail if and only if nominal interest rates are
below the threshold. At nominal rates below the threshold, the competitive
allocation is Pareto superior to the Keynesian allocation: allocations of em-
ployed households are identical but unemployed households are worse-off.
Also, welfare under the competitive allocation is decreasing in r and reaches
the highest value at zero interest rates (first-best). I show that there exist re-
strictions on transfers under which aggregate welfare under the competitive
allocation for a nominal rate equal to the threshold, is greater than aggre-
gate welfare under the Keynesian equilibrium at any nonnegative nominal
rate below the threshold. A policy of setting the interest rate at the thresh-
old can be characterised as “not risky” in the sense that at nominal rates
below the threshold, the worst equilibrium, in terms of aggregate welfare,
might realise.
I denote nominal rates greater that the threshold by rC and nominal
rates below the threshold by rK ; superscript C denotes the competitive
equilibrium and superscript K, the Keynesian equilibrium. rC and rK are
defined as
rC = (1 + δ)
τ − τ̂
2τ̂ − τ , r
K = (1− δ) τ − τ̂
2τ̂ − τ ,
where δ ∈ [0, 1]. At δ = 0, rC = rK . Under case 2, τ̂ < τ < 2τ̂ . I define
τ = θτ̂ , where θ ∈ (1, 2). Substituting into rC and rK , it follows that
interest rates are functions of θ and δ. The advantage of these definitions
is that competitive and Keynesian allocations depend only on δ and θ and
I can present a graph of the welfare results in the (δ, θ)-space.
Aggregate welfare under the competitive allocation is
UC = ln
( 1√
3 + 2rC
)
+ ln
(
1− 1
3 + 2rC
)
;
consumption and labor supply as in proposition 1. UC depends on rC that,
in turn, depends on θ and δ.
Aggregate welfare under the Keynesian allocation is
UK = (1− u)
(
ln
( 1√
3 + 2rK
)
+ ln
(
1− 1
3 + 2rK
))
+ u ln
( τ̂
p∗
)
;
the allocation of employed households is as in proposition 1 and consumption
of unemployed households is τ̂ /p∗. The unemployment rate is equal to
u =
4θδ(θ − 1)(2− θ)(1− δ(θ − 1))
(2δ + 2θ2δ − θ(1 + 4δ))2 ;
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derivation of u can be found in section 6.4 of the “Appendix”. The allocation
of employed households depends on rK that, in turn, depends on θ and δ.
Substituting for p∗ from proposition 1, it follows that the consumption of
unemployed households depends on the ratio τ̂ /τ and rK . Thus, UK is a
function of θ and δ.
At δ = 0, rK = rC = (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ), u = 0 and UK = UC . At an
interest rate equal to the threshold, competitive prices are associated only
with the competitive equilibrium.
The following proposition states that the unemployment rate is a de-
creasing function of rK or, equivalently, an increasing function of δ. This
result is important to understand the welfare comparison that follows.
Proposition 4. u is an increasing function of δ, that is,
∂u
∂δ
> 0.
Proof. See section 6.4 of the “Appendix”.
Figure 1 presents the sign of UC − UK in the (δ, θ)-space.
Figure 1: The sign of UC − UK
Inside the blue region of figure 1, UC −UK > 0, inside the white region,
UC − UK < 0 and at the boundary, UC − UK = 0. Given any θ ∈ (1, 1.6),
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UC at the respective rC is always greater than UK at the respective rK .
Since UC is a decreasing function of r, then UC for r = (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) is
greater than UK for any 0 ≤ r < (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ). Finally, I have extended
the δ−axis to values above 1 in order to demonstrate, graphically, that at
δ = 1 (rK = 0), UC − UK > 0 for any θ ∈ (1, 1.6).
There is an interesting trade-off behind the previous result. Under UK , a
fall of the interest rate is beneficial for employed households but, at the same
time, and according to proposition 4, lower nominal rates are associated with
higher unemployment rates. Also, the utility of each unemployed household
depends on the price level p∗ which is a function of r. p∗ is a decreasing
function7 of r for r < 0.78 and increases with r for r > 0.78. Suppose
θ = 1.5. It is straightforward to show that (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) = 1. Start
from δ = 0 such that rK = rC = 1 and UC = UK . As δ increases, rK falls,
employed households become better-off, the unemployment rate increases
and the consumption of unemployed households increases until rK reaches
0.78 and decreases after that point. Also, as δ increases, rC increases and
UC falls. The increase of the unemployment rate dominates the increase of
employed’s utility and the increase of unemployed’s consumption (until rK
reaches 0.78) such that UK falls faster than UC .
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
I solve for the competitive equilibrium. Agents optimal decisions are given
by (9) and (10) of section 2.4. Superscript i is dropped since households
make identical choices. The monetary authority accommodates the demand
for money and bonds, good’s and labor markets clear and the budget of the
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monetary-fiscal authority is satisfied. It is convenient to use the monetary-
fiscal authority’s budget to solve for the equilibrium, i.e.,
r
1 + r
M +
1
1 + r
pi = τ.
Combining cash-in-advance constraints, good’s and money market clearing,
it follows that M = pc = py. Substituting for M and for firm’s optimal deci-
sions into the monetary-fiscal authority’s budget constraint and rearranging,
I obtain
p2
4w
1 + 2r
1 + r
= τ. (19)
Substituting the optimal decision of agents into good’s market clearing, I
obtain
1
2p
(
τ +
w
1 + r
)
=
p
2w
. (20)
Combining (19) and (20) so as to eliminate τ , I obtain
w
p
=
√
3 + 2r
2
. (21)
Substituting (21) into (19), I obtain
p∗ =
2τ(1 + r)
√
3 + 2r
1 + 2r
. (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), I obtain
w∗ =
τ(1 + r)(3 + 2r)
1 + 2r
. (23)
Finally, substituting (22) and (23) into household’s optimal allocation, I
obtain
c∗ =
1√
3 + 2r
, l∗ =
1
3 + 2r
.
6.2 Equilibria under rationing
First, I compute each type of equilibrium explicitly and demonstrate that
propositions 2 and 3 are true. Subsequently, I demonstrate that multiple
equilibria exist. Prices are restricted in a neighbourhood of (w∗, p∗). A
neighbourhood is defined as an open ball around (w∗, p∗) in the (w, p)−space.
There exist a neighbourhood such that prices in the neighbourhood are
associated with an equilibrium. To show that, I demonstrate that there exist
prices arbitrarily close to competitive prices associated with an equilibrium.
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6.2.1 Excess demand equilibrium
An excess demand equilibrium is characterised by rationing on demand.
Household’s consumption demand is c = c and from the household’s budget
constraint, labor supply is
l =
1 + r
w
(pc− τ);
superscript i is dropped since households make identical choices. Firm’s
demand for labor is L = L, supply of output is y =
√
L and profits are
pi = p
√
L− wL.
As before, I use the monetary-fiscal budget constraint to solve for an
excess demand equilibrium. Combining cash-in-advance constraints, good’s
and money market clearing, it follows that M = pc = p
√
L. Substituting
for M and pi into the monetary-fiscal budget, I obtain
r
1 + r
p
√
L+
1
1 + r
(p
√
L− wL) = τ.
Solving with respect to L, I obtain
L =
(
p(1 + r)±√p2(1 + r)2 − 4w(1 + r)τ)2
4w2
. (24)
I demonstrate shortly that only the small root of (24) is consistent with
an excess demand equilibrium and that the term inside the square root is
positive. Substituting the small root of (24) into good’s market clearing, I
solve for c as a function of parameters
c =
p(1 + r)−√p2(1 + r)2 − 4w(1 + r)τ
2w
. (25)
Rationing on the labor market requires
p2
4w2
> L. (26)
Substituting the big root of L into (26) and rearranging, I obtain
p
2w
>
p(1 + r)
2w
+
√
p2(1 + r)2 − 4w(1 + r)τ
2w
. (27)
(27) can not be satisfied. On the other hand, substituting the small root
into (26) and rearranging, (26) is equivalent to
p2
4w
1 + 2r
1 + r
> τ. (28)
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Also, it can be easily verified that if (28) is satisfied, then the square root
term of (24) and (25) is positive.
Rationing on the good’s market requires
1
2p
(τ +
w
1 + r
) > c. (29)
Substituting (25) into (29) and rearranging, (29) is equivalent to
p2 >
w( w1+r + τ)
2
2(1 + r)( w1+r − τ)
. (30)
(30) represents a restriction on parameters only if w > (1 + r)τ , that is,
the right hand side is positive. Also, competitive equilibrium wages satisfy
w∗/(1 + r)− τ = 2τ/(1 + 2r) > 0. To sum up, policy parameters and prices
associated with an excess demand equilibrium must satisfy (28) and (30).
At (w∗, p∗), excess demands vanish, i.e., (28) and (30) are equalities. The
proof of proposition 1 and in particular, expression (19), implies that (28) is
an equality at competitive prices that, in turn, implies zero excess demand of
labor. If excess demand of labor is zero, then, from good’s market clearing,
excess demand on the good’s market is zero, i.e., c = y∗ =
√
L∗ = c∗.
Substituting (w∗, p∗) into (30) and rearranging, I obtain that it is satisfied
with equality or, equivalently, excess demand on the good’s market is zero.
Finally, according to (24) and (25), as prices converge to (w∗, p∗), c and L
converge to competitive equilibrium demands.
For any given τ > τ̂ and 0 < r <∞, prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗),
that satisfy (28) and (30), are associated with an excess demand equilib-
rium. Also, given τ < τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞ associated with an individually
rational competitive allocation, prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗), that sat-
isfy (28) and (30), imply that excess demand allocations are very close to
competitive allocations and, hence, excess demand equilibrium allocations
are individually rational.
6.2.2 Classical equilibrium
A classical equilibrium is characterised by rationing of households on the
good’s and on the labor market. The decision of employed households is
similar to the decision of households in the excess demand equilibrium. Un-
employed households are rationed on the labor market and their consump-
tion is equal to τ̂ /p. The firm’s optimal decisions are given by (10) of section
2.4.
Combining cash-in-advance constraints, good’s and money market clear-
ing, it follows that M = (1−u)pc+up(τ̂ /p) = p(p/2w). Substituting for M
and pi into the monetary-fiscal budget, I obtain
r
1 + r
p
p
2w
+
1
1 + r
p2
4w
= (1− u)τ + uτ̂ .
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A classical equilibrium requires τ 6= τ̂ otherwise the above equilibrium rela-
tion depends only on exogenous parameters.
Suppose τ > τ̂ . Solving for u, I obtain
u =
τ − p24w 1+2r1+r
τ − τ̂ .
Rationing on the labor market requires 0 < u < 1, or equivalently,
τ̂ <
p2
4w
1 + 2r
1 + r
< τ. (31)
Substituting u into good’s market clearing, it follows that
c =
τ − τ̂
1+2r
1+r
p2
4w − τ̂
( p
2w
− τ̂(τ −
1+2r
1+r
p2
4w )
p(τ − τ̂)
)
.
Rationing on the good’s market requires
1
2p
(τ +
w
1 + r
) > c. (32)
Policy parameters and prices associated with a classical equilibrium must
satisfy (31) and (32).
Suppose τ < τ̂ . u modifies as
u =
p2
4w
1+2r
1+r − τ
τ̂ − τ
and rationing on the labor market requires
τ <
p2
4w
1 + 2r
1 + r
< τ̂ . (33)
Also, c modifies as
c =
τ̂ − τ
τ̂ − 1+2r1+r p
2
4w
( p
2w
− τ̂(
1+2r
1+r
p2
4w − τ)
p(τ̂ − τ)
)
.
and rationing on demand requires (32).
At (w∗, p∗), excess supply and demand vanish. The proof of proposition
1 and in particular, expression (19), implies (p∗2/4w∗)((1 + 2r)/(1 + r)) = τ
that, in turn, implies u = 0. Good’s market clearing and u = 0 imply c =
p∗/2w∗ = y∗ = c∗ that, in turn, implies excess demand is zero. Substituting
(w∗, p∗) into (32), it is straightforward to demonstrate that it is satisfied with
equality and hence, excess demand is zero. Also, according to the explicit
solutions obtained, as prices converge to (w∗, p∗), u converges to zero and c
converges to c∗.
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Given policy parameters, prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) that satisfy
either (31) and (32) or (33) and (32), are associated with a classical equilib-
rium. These inequalities do not contradict one another. To see this, suppose
w > w∗ and (p2/4w)((1 + 2r)/(1 + r)) = τ (u = 0). Substituting the latter
into (32) and rearranging, it follows that (32) is satisfied for any w > w∗.
Thus, there exist prices very close to (w∗, p∗) such that the above inequali-
ties are satisfied. Finally, classical equilibrium allocations satisfy individual
rationality following a similar argument as in section 6.2.1.
6.2.3 Keynesian equilibrium
A Keynesian equilibrium is characterised by rationing on supply. Decisions
of employed households are given by (9) of section 2.4 and the consumption
of unemployed households is τ̂ /p. The firm produces y = y, hires y2 units
of labor and pi = py − wy2.
Combining cash-in-advance constraints, good’s and money market clear-
ing, it follows that M = (1 − u)p((1/2p)/(τ + w/(1 + r))) + up(τ̂ /p) = py.
Substituting for M and pi into the monetary-fiscal budget, I obtain
r
1 + r
py +
1
1 + r
(py − wy2) = (1− u)τ + uτ̂ .
Solving for y as a function of u, I obtain
y =
p(1 + r)±√p2(1 + r)2 − 4w(1 + r)((1− u)τ + uτ̂)
2w
. (34)
Following a similar argument as in section 6.2.1 (excess demand), only the
small root of (34) is consistent with a Keynesian equilibrium. Contrary to
the previous sections, it is more convenient to use labor market clearing,
(1 − u)l = y2, to solve for an equilibrium. Substituting (34) into labor
market clearing and rearranging, I obtain
p
√
p2(1 + r)2 − 4w(1 + r)z = p2(1 + r)− 2wz − (1− u)
( w2
1 + r
− wτ
)
,
where z = (1− u)τ + uτ̂ . Squaring both sides and rearranging, I obtain
αu2 + (−β)u− γ = 0
or, equivalently,
u =
−(−β)−√(−β)2 + 4αγ
2α
(35)
and
u =
−(−β) +√(−β)2 + 4αγ
2α
, (36)
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where
α = w(
w
1 + r
− τ)2 + 4w(τ − τ̂)2 + 4w(τ − τ̂)( w
1 + r
− τ),
β = −2(1 + r)p2( w1+r − τ) + 4w( w1+r − τ)(τ − τ̂)+
4wτ( w1+r − τ) + 2w( w1+r − τ)2 + 8wτ(τ − τ̂)
and
γ = 2(1 + r)(
w
1 + r
− τ)
(
p2 − w(
w
1+r + τ)
2
2(1 + r)( w1+r − τ)
)
.
Rationing on labor and good’s market requires 0 < u < 1 and
p
2w
> y, (37)
respectively. Substituting (34) into (37) and rearranging, (37) is equivalent
to
u > −
p2(1+2r)
4w(1+r) − τ
τ − τ̂ . (38)
If (38) is satisfied, then the square root term of y is positive. Policy pa-
rameters and prices associated with a Keynesian equilibrium must satisfy
0 < u < 1 and (38).
To proceed to the analysis of each case of proposition 3, I will use the
following arguments.
I determine the signs of α, β and γ at (w∗, p∗) that, in turn, impose
restrictions such that 0 < u < 1 at prices close to (w∗, p∗). Substituting
(w∗, p∗) into α and rearranging, α > 0 is equivalent to
4 +
( τ̂
τ
)2 − 4 τ̂
τ
+ 4r
( τ̂
τ
− 1
)2
(1 + r) > 4r
( τ̂
τ
− 1
)
and it is satisfied either for τ > τ̂ or τ < τ̂ . Substituting (w∗, p∗) into β and
rearranging, I obtain
β =
16τ2(1 + r)2(3 + 2r)
(1 + 2r)3
(
τ − τ̂ − r(2τ̂ − τ)
)
. (39)
β < 0 if τ < τ̂ and β > 0 only if τ > τ̂ . Moreover, tedious algebra implies
that α > β whenever β > 0. Lastly, according to the discussion after
expression (30) in section 6.2.1, it follows that γ = 0.
Excess supplies vanish if u = 0 and if (37) or, equivalently, (38) is an
equality. According to expression (19), proof of proposition 1, the right
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hand side of (38) is zero at (w∗, p∗). As a result, if u = 0 at (w∗, p∗), then
(38) is an equality and excess supply on the good’s market is zero whereas
if 0 < u < 1 at (w∗, p∗), then (38) is satisfied and excess supply is positive.
Finally, consider the solutions of u. At (w∗, p∗), γ = 0 implies that at
least one solution satisfies u = 0.
Consider case 1, i.e., τ̂ > τ and 0 < r < ∞. Prices close to (w∗, p∗)
satisfy α > 0 and β < 0 and only (36) can be a candidate for equilibrium.8
At (w∗, p∗), γ = 0 implies u = 0. As a result, if there exist prices associ-
ated with a Keynesian equilibrium, then the equilibrium is characterised by
vanishing excess supplies. Prices associated with a Keynesian equilibrium
exist. Consider the following inequalities:
w( w1+r + τ)
2
2(1 + r)( w1+r − τ)
< p2 ≤ 4w(1 + r)τ
1 + 2r
. (40)
For any 0 < τ < ∞ and 0 < r < ∞, the upper and lower bounds of (40)
cross at w∗ and ŵ, where ŵ > w∗. (40) is a well-defined interval for any
w∗ < w < ŵ and it is equivalent to γ > 0 and to the right hand side of (38)
being non-positive. If prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) satisfy (40), then
γ > 0 implies 0 < u < 1 that, in turn, implies (38) is satisfied since its right
the hand is non-positive. Finally, Keynesian allocations satisfy individual
rationality following a similar argument as in section 6.2.1.
Consider case 2, i.e., τ̂ < τ < 2τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞. Under 2(a), β > 0 at
(w∗, p∗) because 0 < r < (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) and under 2(b), β ≤ 0 at (w∗, p∗)
because (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) ≤ r.
Consider 2(a). At (w∗, p∗), γ = 0 implies u = 0 for (35) and 0 < u =
β/α < 1 for (36). A Keynesian equilibrium exists at competitive prices.
Moreover, there exist prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) associated with two
Keynesian equilibria. Consider the following inequalities:
4w(1 + r)τ
1 + 2r
≤ p2 < w(
w
1+r + τ)
2
2(1 + r)( w1+r − τ)
. (41)
(41) is a well-defined interval for (1 + r)τ < w < w∗, and it is equivalent
to γ < 0 and to the right hand side of (38) being non-positive. If prices
arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) satisfy (41), then γ < 0 implies 0 < u < 1,
for both solutions, that, in turn, implies (38) is satisfied. Also, there exist
prices associated with only one equilibrium of the Keynesian type, that is,
only (36) satisfies 0 < u < 1. Consider the following inequalities:
p2 >
w( w1+r + τ)
2
2(1 + r)( w1+r − τ)
, p2 ≥ 4w(1 + r)τ
1 + 2r
. (42)
8(35) implies u < 0.
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(42) is equivalent to γ > 0 and to the right hand side of (38) being non-
positive. Prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) that satisfy (42) are associated
with one equilibrium of the Keynesian type.
Consider 2(b) and (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ) < r < ∞. Prices close to (w∗, p∗)
satisfy α > 0 and β < 0 and only (36) can be a candidate for equilibrium.
At (w∗, p∗), γ = 0 implies u = 0. As a result, if prices are associated with
a Keynesian equilibrium, then the equilibrium is characterised by vanishing
excess supplies. Prices associated with a Keynesian equilibrium exists, e.g.,
prices arbitrarily close to (w∗, p∗) that satisfy (42) are associated with an
equilibrium of a Keynesian type.
Consider 2(b) and r = (τ − τ̂)/(2τ̂ − τ), where β = 0 at (w∗, p∗). At
(w∗, p∗), γ = 0 implies u = 0 for both solutions. This is a tedious case to
analyse since β can take either sign for prices close to (w∗, p∗). Nevertheless,
if prices arbitrarily close to competitive prices satisfy (42), then (36) satisfies
0 < u < 1, irrespective of the sign of β, and a Keynesian equilibrium exists.
The argument under case 3 is similar to 2(a) and will not be repeated.
6.2.4 Multiple equilibria
Policy parameters and prices are associated with equilibria of different types.
Suppose τ > τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞. Prices that satisfy (28) and (30) and
hence, are associated with an excess demand equilibrium, satisfy also (42)
and are associated with a Keynesian equilibrium.
Suppose τ < τ̂ and 0 < r < ∞. There exist prices that satisfy w > w∗
and (p2/4w)((1+2r)/(1+r)) > τ and are associated with a classical equilib-
rium. These prices are associated, also, with an excess demand equilibrium
since (p2/4w)((1 + 2r)/(1 + r)) > τ is equivalent to (28), w > w∗ and (28)
imply (30) (see the discussion after (40)) and an excess demand equilibrium
exist.
6.3 Seignorage profits and nominal wages
I demonstrate the comparative static results of seignorage and nominal
wages with respect to r.
Substituting for w∗ and l∗, it follows that seignorage profits are equal to
r
1 + r
w∗l∗ = τ
r
1 + 2r
.
Profits increase with r and converge to τ/2 as r →∞.
The derivative of w∗ with respect to r is
∂w∗
∂r
= τ
5 + 4r
1 + 2r
− τ 2(1 + r)(3 + 2r)
(1 + 2r)2
and for r = (
√
2 − 1)/2 it is zero, for r < (√2 − 1)/2 negative and for
r > (
√
2− 1)/2 positive.
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6.4 Section 5 (Welfare)
I compute the unemployment rate, prove proposition 4 and compute the
derivative of p∗ with respect to r.
According to section 6.2.3 (Keynesian equilibrium), the unemployment
rate, at competitive prices, under 2(a), is equal to u = β/α. Substituting
for α and β and rearranging, u is equal to
u =
4(1 + r)(τ − τ̂ − r(2τ̂ − τ))
τ + τ(1 + 2r)2(1− τ̂τ ) + 2(τ − τ̂)(1 + 2r)
.
Substituting for r = rK and τ = θτ̂ and rearranging, it follows that
u =
4θδ(θ − 1)(2− θ)(1− δ(θ − 1))
(2δ + 2θ2δ − θ(1 + 4δ))2 .
The derivative with respect to δ is
∂u
∂δ
= −4θ(2− θ(3− θ))(2δ(θ − 1)− θ)
(2δ + 2δθ2 − θ(1 + 4δ))3
and it is positive for any θ ∈ (1, 2) and δ ∈ [0, 1].
The derivative of p∗ with respect to r is equal to
∂p∗
∂r
= −τ 4(1 + r)
√
2r + 3
(1 + 2r)2
+ τ
2(1 + r)
(1 + 2r)
√
2r + 3
+ τ
2
√
2r + 3
1 + 2r
and for r = 0.780776 it is zero, for r < 0.780776 negative and for r >
0.780776 positive.
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